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1. INTRODUCTION 
We consider a differential game governed by the following 
i = AZ +f(u, u), tZ0 
(1.1) 
40) = zo, 
where, z, z0 E R”, are the state and initial state, u E U c RP, u E VC IRY are 
the controls of the pursuer and the evader, respectively, A is an (n x n)- 
matrix and f: U x V -+ R” is a given mapping. Also, we are given a subspace 
M of IR”. The game is ended when the state z reaches set M. Thus, M is 
called the terminal set. The goal of the pursuer is to terminate the game by 
choosing a suitable control 
u(.)E% 4 (u: [0, cc)+ U, measurable], 
while the goal of the evader is to prevent the game from terminating by 
choosing a proper control 
a( .) E Y 4 (u: [0, co) + V, measurable}. 
In an evasion game, which is considered in this paper, the pursuer 
chooses his control u( .)E@ at the start of the game. The evader, on the 
other hand, chooses the values of his control as the game evolves and can 
use {z(s), u(s)1 0 <s ,< t} when he chooses the value u(t) of the evasion 
control u( .) E -Y- at time t. We denote #” to be the set of all such evasion 
controls. 
* Part of this work was done while the author was in Purdue University and supported by 
the David Ross Fellowship of Purdue University. 
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DEFINITION 2.1. The game is said to be evadable, if for any z0 E Rn\ M, 
u( .) E 3!, there exists a u(. ) E fl, such that 
d(M, z(t)) > 0, vtao. 
where, z( . ) is the trajectory of (1.1) corresponding to u( ) and u( . ); d( ., ) is 
the Euclidean distance in R”. 
The evadability problem of differential evasion games has been exten- 
sively studied by many authors, see [l-7], for example, and the references 
cited therein. In the discussion of evadability, one usually assumed some 
superiority of the evader over the pursuer. In particular, for a game of form 
( I. 1 ), one often essentially assumes, that 
(1.2) 
Namely, the evader has more than enough “power” to overcome the effect 
of the pursuit control. In [6], Satimov discusses a very special case in 
which the evader and the pursuer have the same “power.” He obtained the 
evadability of the game by using the particular structure of the system. 
The purpose of this paper is to use the idea of [6] to study our game 
(1.1). We will get the evadability of the game under very weak superiority 
of the evader to the pursuer. 
2. PRELIMINARIES 
Suppose A is an (n x n)-matrix. Its minimal polynomial is the following 
(2.1 1 
where k <n. Let us denote 
0 a0 
1 0 a1 
1 . . . a2 
’ . ’ . 
. . 
. o ak-2 
1 ak-l 
> a= 
kxk 
Also, we let ei = (0, . . . . 0, l(l), 0, . . . . O)=E Rk, 0 B i Q k - 1. 
a0 
aI 
a2 
akm2 
‘ak I 1. kxl 
LEMMA 2.1. For all t E R, 
k-l 
e A’= izo giCt) A’, (2.2) 
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where 
t - T)~ (e,, eAru) dr, O<i<k-1. (2.3) 
Proof Let g(t) = (g,,(t), . . . . g,- ,(t))’ be the unique solution of the 
following problem 
$Jg 
(2.4) 
g(O) = eo. 
Then, 
g(')(O) = Aieo = ei, O<i<k-1 
gck)( f) = Jkg( t) = eAfAkeo = f+a. 
Hence, by Taylor expansion, 
g,(t)=~+~~‘(f--)*gjx’(r)dr 
. 0 
=g+&[i(f--~)‘(e~,e”‘a)dr, O<i,<k-1. 
Now, let us set 
k-l 
F(t)=eA’- 1 gi(t) A’. 
i=O 
Then, one has, noting q(A) = 0, that 
k-l 
F(t)=AzA’- c g$)A’ 
i=O 
k-l 
=AeAt- a,&-,(t)Z+ 1 (gi-l(t)+ajgk-,(t))A’ 
i= 1 
I 
k-l 
=AeA’- 1 gi-l(t)Ai+gk-l(t)[Ak--(A)] 
i=l 
Since F(0) = 0, our conclusion follows. m 
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Remark 2.2. By the uniqueness of the solution of (2.4), one has 
g(t) f 03 VtER. 
Also, from (2.3), we have the existence of a 8 E (0, 11, such that 
g,(t) > 03 g:t t) > 0, tE (0, fn O<igk- 1. 
(2.5) 
(2.6) 
LEMMA 2.3. Let pi(t), . . . . p,(t) be measurable, bounded functions defined 
on [0, T], with values in W. Let pi(t), . . . . p,,,(t) be measurable nonnegative 
scalar functions defined on [0, T], satisfying Cy! 1 ui( t) = 1. Then, for any 
E > 0, there exists a measurable function p( .) with values p(t) in the set 
(p,(t), . . . . p,,,(t)} at any t E [0, T], and the value p(t) of p( .) at time t only 
depends on {pi(s), p,(s)\ 0 G s G t, 1 < i < m}, such that for any nonnegative 
nondecreasing scalar function q( . ), 
k(r)pi(t)-p(~) dz Q&q(T)E. (2.7) 
1 Ii 
Proof. By Lemma 2.1 of [2], we know that for any E > 0, there exists a 
measurable function p( .) satisfying all the requirements we want except 
(2.7) and such that 
sup 
rE[O,T] 
Then, let us denote p(.)= (p’(.), . . . . p’(.))’ and p,(s)= (p,‘(.) ,..., p;(.))? 
By the Second Mean Value Theorem, we have, for t E [0, T], that 
iI~~q(1-T)[~,I(i(T)Pi(I)P(I)]dTi12 
2 pi(T)p{(T)-pi(T) dt 2 
i=l 1 I 
1 I 
2 
~i(r)~j(t)-~j(~) dT 
< rq( t)2 E*. 1 
3. EVADABILITY 
In this section, we prove the main result of this paper. 
THEOREM 3.1. In the evasion game defined by (1 .l ) and terminal set M 
let the following hold: 
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(1) The function f is continuous. 
(2) The sets U and V are compact. 
(3) The minimal polynomial of A is given by (2.1) with k < n. 
(4) The terminal set M is a subspace of Iw” with dim M’ = m > k 
(5) There exist 0 < i0 <k - 1 and 6 > 0, such that 
ZTAy( U, V) = (O}, O<i<i,- 1 (3.1) 
OE$~CO (,::‘v::.,E) (3.2) 
inf inf max I($, nA?f(u, v))l 2 6, 
uEu~~M~,II~II=I “CV (3.3) 
where, IT: !W + M’ is the orthogonal projection. Then, the game (1.1) with 
terminal set M is evadable. 
Remark 3.2. It is clear that (3.2) is implied by 
OE (-) COf(U, V). (3.4) 
ueu 
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Let Z~E [w”\M, u( .) E%! be given. Let 0 < 8 d 1 
be as in (2.6). Also, we have L > 0, such that 
I g,(t)1 6 L tE[O,KJ,O<i<k-1 
II flAif(u, VIII d L (u,v)~UxV,O<i<k-1 (3.5) 
I(ei, edtaIl d L, tE[O,tI],O<i<k-1. 
Case 1. Suppose for t E [0,0], 
Then, we let 
17eA*z0 # 0. 
b = o fif: B 11 Z7eA’zo (1 > 0. 
. . 
(3.6) 
By (3.2), for given u( .) E @ we have, using Filippov’s lemma, vi( .) E V” and 
pj(. ), 1 <j< r 3 (k - iO) m + 1, such that 
jcl pji(t) = 1, pjLi(t) 2 0, 1 GjG r 
i Pjtt) 
nAiof(u(t)y vj(t)) 
= 0. 
j= 1 flAkelf(U(t), Vj(t)) 
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Then, we take 
b 
E=2(k-io)L’o. 
By Lemma 2.3, there exists a measurable function p( .), such that p(t) only 
depends on {p/(s), Ii’A’f(u(s), V,(S))\ 0 6 s < t, 1 <j < Y, i0 6 i Q k - 1 }, and 
nAiof(U(t), Uj(t)) 
p(t) E 
nAk-!f(U(t), llj(t)) 
for any nonnegative nondecreasing scalar function q( . ). It is clear that 
there exists O( .) E @, such that 
( 
K4’of(24( t), q t)) 
p(t) = o<t<e. 
flFik- ‘.f(u(t), G(t)) i> 
Thus, by taking the evasion control O( .), one has 
4M, z(t)) = II Wt)ll 
> (IIleA’zo(I - kf’J’Z7Ai~(u(r), S(r))g,(t-s)& 
II ;=o 0 ;I 
k- I 
ah-(k-i,)J;Ls=;, tE [O, e]. 
Now, at time t = 8, if we have 
ZIeAtz(0) # 0, o<tte, 
then, we can repeat the above argument to get the evadability on [0,2fI] 
and so on. Otherwise, we are in the following situation. 
Case 2. Suppose for some to> 0, 
k-l 
IIeAfozO z C gi(to) 17Aizo = 0. 
i=O 
(3.7) 
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By (2.5), we get that { l7A’z, (0 d i < k - 1) is linearly dependent. Hence, 
dim(Span{17Aiz,10<iQk-l))<kQmrdimM’. 
Thus, noting that ~~A’z,,E Ml, 0 d i < k - 1, we have the existence of a 
$ E ML, I( $ )I = 1, such that 
(II/, h’Aizo) = 0, O<i<k--1. 
Now, by (3.3), for given u( .) E a(, we can take I?( .) E v, such that 
ItIc/, ~AiOf(4t), fi(t)))l 2 6. 
Then, under this evasion control, we have, for I E [0,&J, that 
> [f6gio(~)dvL ‘2’ I^‘gi(T)dr 
‘0 i=io+l O 
26 
where, 
K=L i - (io+ l)! ei-io-* 
j=io+l (i+ l)! 
tiO+ l)! ok-b-l 
+L*(k-io- 1) (k+ l)! . 
Then, if we let 0, = min (0,6/2K), we have 
*io+ I 6 -- 4M4W(io+ l)! 2, t E (07~01. 
Since z(0) = z. E R”\M, we get 
d(M, z(f)) > 0, t E co, 001. 
Since 19 and B. are absolute constants, we can easily repeat the above 
arguments to get the evadability of the game. 1 
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4. AN APPLICATION 
We present an example in this section. Let us consider a differential 
game foverned by the following system (cf. [ 3 or 51) 
where, u = (u,, u2, u,)‘, u = (u,, u2, u3)=, 
andziE(W,U:+u:~~:,V:+V:~~:,IU3(~~pl,IU3I~P2.Theterminalsetis 
M= {Zl =z*=o L 
In [S], some conditions were imposed on 1,) &, /J,, p2 in order to get 
the evadability of the game. Here, we assume that 1, = & = A > 0, 
fl, = flZ E /I > 0, i.e., the evader and the pursuer have the same “power.” It is 
clear that this case is not included in the cases discussed in [S]. In fact, we 
will see that the conditions of the main theorem of [5], which look similar 
to (3.3) are not satisfied in our case, in general. 
It is clear that A* = 0. Thus, k = 2 = dim MI. Hence, conditions (1) and 
(2) of Theorem 3.1 hold. Also, if we let n: R4 + M’ be the orthogonal 
projection, then 
wlv v = (0) (4.3 1 
Z7Af(u, v) = (24, U)E ux v, (4.4) 
where, U=V=B:(O)x[-fi,fi],B~(O)Li {yeR*((lyl(<Af. Since we 
have 
.I-(% u) = 0, VUE u, (4.5) 
(3.4) holds, and hence so does (3.2). Now, we show that (3.3) holds. To 
this end, let I(/ E Ml, )I # II= 1. Th en, I(/=(v~,O)~ with ~E[W*, 1/ql1=1. 
Then for any u E U, by taking u E V with u3 = u), one has 
(l),17Af(u,u))=qT y,“’ 
( 3 
-sinu3)(~1~-~). 
cos u3 2 
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Let us denote 
Then, (It (( = 1. Now, if we take 
Vl 
0 02 
= -Xsgn(ultI + f+L)15, (sgn 0 & 1) 
then 
(4.6) 
Hence, (3.3) holds and the game is evadable. 
We note from (4.2) that for j?<x/2, 
(-) mf(u, v= (0). (4.7) 
ueu 
Thus, in this case, the conditions of the main theorem of [5] are not 
satisfied. 
Also, we can see that in order to have (3.4), we only need to take 
v= {(v~,u2,v3)(v:+v:=~2,lv3l~pj. 
It is clear that for this V, we still have (4.6). Thus the game is still evadable. 
But now, the evader is even “less” powerful than the pursuer. 
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